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ARGUME~T
Plaintiff/Appellee C504750P, LLC c·Plaintiff') tries desperately in its brief to avoid
the relevant issues that require reversal of the trial court's default judgment to be set aside.
First, it asserts that Defendant/ Appellant Staci Baker c·Mrs. Baker") failed to preserve two
of the three issues she asserts on appeal: that (I) Mrs. Baker has a meritorious defense, and
\vas thus entitled to have the ddault judgment set aside~ and (2) the trial court erred in
a\varding attorney fees. Plaintiff is wrong. As discussed belovv, Mrs. Baker specifically
preserved both issues.
Plaintiff also tries to avoid the third issue-that service by publication is
constitutionally deficient, because there \Vere other means of service available-by
attempting to change the issue to whether alternative service was justified. However, as has
been plainly stated, Mrs. Baker does not contest on appeal whether alternative service was
justified. This appeal is about whether the particular method of alternative service ordered
was constitutionally sound. In keeping with this charade, Plaintiff goes so far as to assert in
its .. Constitutional or Statutory Provisions" section that it .. does not believe there is a
constitutional provision which is directly relevant or material to this appeal." Appellee 's
Brief at l. When Plaintiff finally gets around to addressing publication, it boldly asserts that
.. publication through a newspaper was a likely means to inform Defendant of the lawsuit."

Id. at 27. Mrs. Baker will discuss why this assertion, directly contrary to United States
Supreme Court precedent, Utah Supreme Court precedent, and common sense, is also
unsupported by any fact in this case.

I.

MRS. BAKER PRESERVED ALL ISSUES SHE HAS RAISED ON APPEAL.
In order to avoid having to deal with ( l) the caselaw requiring default judgments to

be set aside in the presence of a meritorious defense, and (2) the plain error in awarding
attorney fees in the absence of a contract authorizing such a remedy, Plaintiff asserts that
Mrs. Baker failed to preserve either of these issues. ln support of this fiction, Plaintiff
represents that the sole basis for relief asserted by Mrs. Baker in her motion to set aside the
judgement was that ··the default judgment was ·void' for lack of service pursuant to Rule
60(b)(4)." Appellee's Brief at 13. Plaintiff made the same representation to the trial court
below· in an effort to get the trial court to disregard the other bases supporting relief, which

it asserts were raised for the first time in Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum. R. 292
(""Defendant. in her Initial Memorandum, claimed only that the default judgment was void
and, therefore, sought relief from the default judgment on the basis that the judgment was
void due to lack ofservic~ under Rule 60(b)(4)."); R. 365 c·As we have set forth in our
motion to strike and in fact in our memorandum in opposition. the only issue raised in this
motion was that the service was void."). 1 Plaintiff was wrong then and it is wrong now.
As an initial matter. Mrs. Baker did not cite only Rule 60(b )( 4 ). as represented by
Plaintiff. ln fact, her motion did not cite any specific subsection of the rule. It did, however,
discuss more than one subsection, R. 129, and plainly set forth both arguments Plaintiff
represents were not raised. With respect to attorney fees, Mrs. Baker argued: '"Moreover,
there is no basis or evidence for award and attorneys' fees when Mrs. Baker never signed any

1

The trial court never ruled on this issue. R. 372-373; R. 328-331; and R. 332-333.

2

document providing for the recovery of attorneys' fees and there is no basis under the law
for which attorneys' fees should be awarded. (Utah R. Civ. P. 73)." R. 131 (Memorandum
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Relief from Default Judgment) at n. l. With respect
to the meritorious defense, Mrs. Baker then argued in her moving memorandum:
Similarly, there is no basis for the award of title to the Property considering the
appraised value of the Property of $124,000.00 and the purported purchase
price of $15,000.00 for which the Plaintiff purchased the Property from a
relative ( everything about this transaction appears to be an effort to
fraudulently deprive Mrs. Baker of her interest in the Property).
Jd.2

Plaintiffs effort to ignore these arguments began immediately. In its memorandum
in opposition, Plaintiff cited an email from Mrs. Baker's husband, which set forth the
meritorious defense. However, Plaintiff quoted only selectively from the email, leaving out
any mention of Mr. Baker's concerns over the illegitimate nature of the transaction. Plaintiff

2

Plaintiff notes on appeal that ··Defendant acknowledged in her memorandum in
support of her Motion to Set Aside that· [b ]ecause it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions
to examine the merits of the claim, [Defendant] will reserve briefing all issues that go to the
merits of the claim and award sought by Plaintiff.,.. Appellee Brief at 19. Meritorious
defense arguments. however, do not seek to resolve the merits of a dispute, despite their
nomenclature. Rather, a defendant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside if it can
establish that an issue has sufficient color at least to be tried. See Men=ies v. Galetka, 2006
UT 81, ~ I 08. 150 P .3d 480 (""A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default
judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried.") (quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Intern.
Forivarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994)). Indeed, Plaintiffs overly narrow
reading of the caselaw limiting Rule 60(b) review from any consideration of the case's
underlying merits would eviscerate the entire body of caselaw holding that defendants are
generally ··entitled'' to have a default judgment set aside where a meritorious defense exists.
See. e.g., Aspenbrook Homemvners Ass 'n v. Dahl, 2014 UT App 99, i110, 329 P.3d 822,826
cert. denied sub nom. Aspenbrook v. Dahl, 337 P.3d 295 (Utah 2014) ('"Generally, 'a movant
is entitled to have a default judgment set aside under [rule] 60(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure] if ... the movant has alleged a meritorious defense.") (citations omitted).
3

thus stated, referring to a letter it had sent requesting Mrs. Baker's presence at the closing
scheduled for the transaction:
On July 31, 2014, Defendant responded to this letter via email. The email
stated that "I am providing the following on behalf of my wife Staci Baker
regarding the tax sale property at 16 l W. Paci fie Ori ve in American [F]ork."
He continued, stating that he '"will not be cooperating with [PlaintiffJ on the
proposed sale of the tax sale home at 161 Pacific Drive in American Fork."
He finally stated that he ••intend[s] to pursue collection of these lost rents in
any legal proceedings that become necessary. Conduct yourselves accordingly,
Staci Baker."
R. 193 at ~I 7.
By selectively quoting the email, Plaintiff attempted to avoid dealing with the
following language regarding the meritorious defense:
I am quite confident that the ·sale' referenced in the tax sale statute was never
intended to refer to a process in which the original owner who had lost interest
in the property was able to cheat the tax sale interest purchaser out of their
[sic] statutorily defined return by selling the property to a related party in a
non-arm's length transaction and at a very steep discount from fair market
value. Furthermore, I am strongly convinced you would have a difficult time
selling that interpretation to a judge. If you would like to put the property up
for sale and sell it at fair market value then [ would not oppose the sale.
Unless and until such time, I oppose the sale and will not cooperate with it.
However, if Mr [sic] Collings believes his 'sale' represents the property"s fair
value, then l would happily agree to purchase the property for $15, l 00 and buy
Mr. Collings out of his interest.
R. 235-36.

Mrs. Baker, of course, pointed out this omission in her reply memorandum, where she
expounded upon the arguments she first raised in her moving memorandum. With respect
to the meritorious defense. Mrs. Baker argued:
Such a disparity in the appraised value of the Property [$124,000] and the
purchase price [$15,000] in the REPC, under which the Property was sold to
4

a relative in a non-ann' s length transaction at the expense of Defendant, Mrs.
Baker, calls into question the entire transaction contemplated by the REPC, if
not the integrity of the Plaintiff and the seller under the REPC. A case with
such facts is the precise reason for Rule 60(b
catchall language which
allmvs the Court .. upon such terms as arc just'· and in the .. furtherance of
justice.. to relieve a party from final judgment based on any of the reasons set
forth therein, including ··any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

rs

R. 229-30. ~frs. Baker also expounded upon her attorney fees argument:
The av.:ard of attorneys' fees against Stacie Baker is also unjust. In Utah an
a\vard of attorneys' fees can be made if a statute provides for such an award
or a contract between the parties provides for such an award. IHC Health
Services v. D&K 1Hanagement, 2008 UT 73, ii 39, 196 P.3d 588. The basis for
attorneys' fees stated in the judgment is section 17 of the Real Estate Purchase
Contract. That \Vas not a contract bet\veen Plaintiff and Mrs. Baker, and Mrs.
Baker is not a signatory to that contract. Therefore, there \vas no basis for an
a\vard of attorneys· fees and the judgment should be set aside.

R. 229.
In short. Mrs. Baker preserved the meritorious defense and attorney foes issues, in
addition to the constitutionally ddicient service issue, for appeal by squarely presenting the
issues to the trial court for decision. See Prau \'. 1Velsv11, 2007 UT 41,

~I

15, 164 P.3d 366

( citations omitted) c·Generally, · in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that
issue."').
Accordingly, the case law Plaintiff cites holding that a party may not rely on 60(b )( 6)'s
catchall provision ••if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule

5

60(b)," Appellee's Brief at 16 (citations omitted), is inapposite here, as Mrs. Baker's motion
to set aside the judgment was based on three independent errors, two of which fall within the
rule's catchall provision.
11.

MRS. BAKER DID NOT ABANDO~ ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF DURI~G
ORAL ARGUMENT.
Plaintiffs effort to avoid the meritorious defense and attorney fees issues does not

stop with its argument about preservation. Apparently feeling the need to have a backup to
this unfounded argument. Plaintiff also represents that Mrs. Baker abandoned these t\VO
issues during her oral argument on the motion to set aside (an assertion necessarily premised
on an admission that the issues had, in fact, been raised to begin with). Plaintiff represents:
--ouring oral argument, Defendant effectively abandoned such other arguments and only
argued that the defaultjudgment was void because of failure of service (i.e., pursuant to Rule
60tb)(4 ))." Appellee Brief at 18. In suppo1t of this representation, Plaintiff cites R. 342-373:
that is, the entire hearing transcript save the caption and appearance pages, as well as the
index. There is a reason Plaintiff does not cite to any specific excerpt of the transcript to
support its representation: none exists. Rather, the transcript of the hearing is replete with
argument from Mrs. Baker·s counsel in support of both issues.
For example, with respect to the meritorious defense, Mrs. Baker's counsel argued:
··on November 26th of 2014 this court entered a default judgment against Staci Baker which
in essence sanctioned an insider transaction that deprived Ms. Baker of 40%), her 40%
interest in a home \vorth about $124,000 in exchange for which she only received $5,000, at

6

least in the judgment." R. 343 at lines 4: 16-20. Counsel returned to this issue later in his
argument:
But that is the insider transaction. Those are the same people. That's Mr.
Collings (phonetic) and his son is on the other transaction, Mr. Collings
{phonetic). So you've got Mr. Collings (phonetic) and his son on both sides of
this transaction where they, they sell this property for $15,000 instead of what
it was worth.
R. 345 at lines 6: 19-25.
\Vith respect to attorney fres. Mrs. Baker's counsel argued: ·~But there was no basis
for attorney· s fees as to ~frs. Baker because she never signed a contract which would allow
them to take attorney's fees, nor did she, nor is there a statute which would allow that." R.
343-44 at lines 4:24-5:2. At the close of his argument, counsel stated: .. And then l just
emphasize again that we've got this problem of an attorney's fee award that there's no basis
for." R. 357 at lines 18:9-11.
In short, just as there is no factual basis to support Plaintiffs representation that Mrs.
Baker failed to preserve all appellate issues, there is no factual basis to support its
representation that Mrs. Baker abandoned these issues at oral argument. Rather, the record
directly refutes Plaintiffs representations. 3

III.

.a

MRS. BAKER'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE E~TITLED HER TO HAVE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE .
Plaintiff argues in its brief that .. Utah's Partial Interest Tax Purchaser statute mandates

that a person who purchases an undivided interest of less than 49 1% at a tax sale "may not

3

Plaintiff did not raise any objection to these arguments at the hearing, nor did it press
for a ruling on its motion to strike these arguments, which it had alleged, erroneously, were
made for the first time in Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum.
7

object' to a subsequent sale by the majority property owner." Appellee Brief at 12 (quoting
Utah Code § 59-2-1351. 7).

Mrs. Baker takes no issue with this assertion; however,

Plaintiffs argument merely begs the question of what the legislature meant by sale. Plaintiff
would argue that the word sale includes an inside deal with a close relative at a reverseengineered price far below its actual market value. Mrs. Baker submits that it would not.
Plaintiff quotes State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304, 169 P.3d 778, for the
proposition that the court's ···task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to
correct or revise them."' Id. at iI l l (quoting State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 19, 150 P.3d
540). Mrs. Baker could not agree more. The question becomes which party's interpretation
most faithfully adheres to the common, ordinary, and reasonable meaning of sale, and which
seeks to interpret the term in a way foreign to common understanding. See Hutter v. Dig-It,
Inc., 2009 UT 69,

~I 32,

219 P.3d 918 (""When interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a

contrary indication, that the legislature used each tenn advisedly according to its ordinary and
usually accepted meaning."). Mrs. Baker submits that interpreting sale to include sham
inside transactions reflects neither the ordinary nor usually accepted meaning of the word.
The unreasonableness of Plaintiffs interpretation is reflected in the unreasonableness
of its actions surrounding the sale.

After reverse-engineering the price, Mrs. Baker's

husband demanded that, if Plaintiff \Vere interested in selling the property, that it list the
property on the market where it's fair market value could be obtained. R. 235-36. Mr.
Baker further offered that if Plaintiff truly believed $15,000 truly represented the property's
fair market value, he '·would happily agree to purchase the property for $15, l 00 and buy

8

[Plaintiff] out of his interest." R. 235-36. Plaintiff, of course, ignored this offer, as it was
never its interest to sell the property; only to rid Mrs. Baker from title as inexpensively as
possible.
Finally, it must be remembered that to mount a meritorious defense, a defendant need
not prove its case but only show that its defense is entitled to be heard and tried. Nfen=ies v.

Galerka, 2006 UT 81. •j 108, 150 P.Jd 480 (""A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a
default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried.'') ( quoting Erickson v. Schenkers In rem.

Fonrnrders. Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, l 149 (Utah 1994)). Plaintiff never even attempted to
distinguish this caselaw or its application to this case, seeking instead to try to avoid this
issue completely by arguing it was not preserved.

IV.

MRS. BAKER'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IS BASED ONLY ON MATTERS
PROPERLY CO~TAI~ED I~ THE RECORD.
An appdlate court's .. review is "limited to the evidence contained in the record on

appeal."' Shurtle_ffl'. United Ejjbrr Plan Trust,

:w12 UT 47, '16 n.4, 289 P.3d 408 (citations

omitted). Plaintiff argues that ~lrs. Baker· s assertions regarding .. the value of the property
and the circumstances of the sale are not factually supported by the record." Appellee·s Brief
at 33 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff asserts that this defense was not properly raised or
preserved below," because Mrs. Baker's ··conclusory value assertions (i.e., that the value of
the property was $140,000) in her Reply Memorandum were unverified and inadmissible and
must be disregarded on appeal (as in the District Court)." Id.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not argue that Mrs. Baker's value assertions (an
appraisal) were unverified or inadmissible in any of its papers below. R. 191-223 (Plaintiffs

9

memorandum in opposition to Mrs. Baker's motion to set aside defaultjudgment); R 288-289
(Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum); R 290-295
(Plaintiffs memorandum in support of its motion to strike); R. 306-311 (Plaintiffs reply
memorandum in support of its motion to strike). Nor did Plaintiff object to the introduction
of this testimony at the hearing on the motions. R. 342-3 73.
tvloreover, like the other issues Plaintiff represents were raised for the first time in
Mrs. Baker"s reply memorandum. Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker's value assertion
was raised for the first time in her reply memorandum has no basis in fact. Indeed. Mrs.
Baker squarely asserted the property's value ($124.000, not $140,000) in her memorandum
in support of her motion to set aside the judgment. R. 127 at~ 12 (''A retrospective appraisal
of the Property resulted in an appraised value of $124,000.00 (the 'Appraisal') (See
Appraisal attached hereto as Exhibit D).'') (emphasis in original). Mrs. Baker also discussed

the appraised value in her reply memorandum, R. 229 C"Ho\'vever, the appraised value of the
Property is $124,000.00 (Exhibit C to Defendant's Memorandum. also attached hereto as
Exhibit ·c )"), as well as at the hearing, R. 3-+3, again without objection. Thus, there is no
m~rit to Plaintiffs argument that Mrs. Baker relied on matters not ofrecord in support of her
meritorious defense.-4
V.

THE COURT ERRED I~ A\VARDING ATTOR~EY FEES.

Further explaining why Plaintiff is desperate to argue Mrs. Baker failed to preserve
certain issues-desperate enough to make representations that have no basis in fact-is that
4

Ironically, as discussed below, in section VI, it is Plaintiff, not Mrs. Baker, that has
relied on matters not of record.
10

Plaintiff can offer no justification for the trial court's award of attorney fees, or Plaintiffs
decision to put such an award into its proposed form of order submitted to the trial court.
There being no basis for an award ofattomey fees in this case, Plaintiff led the trial court into
committing plain error. Plaintiff makes no attempt whatever in its brief to justify its actions
or the unfounded award. lnstead, its only defense is to try to convince this Court not even
to consider the issue. The fact remains, however. that the issue was properly preserved-in
1\lrs. Baker's moving memorandum, in her reply memorandum, and at the hearing. Once
brought to the trial court's attention, this egregious error alone should have caused the trial
court to set aside its judgment. The trial court's refusal to do so must be corrected.
VI.

SERVICE BY PUBLICA TIO~ \VAS IMPROPER IN THIS CASE.

Presumably trying to raise a strawman it can knock down, Plaintiff devotes most of
its brief relating to service by publication to arguing that alternative service was justified.
As Mrs. Baker has repeatedly made clear, however, she is not challenging the trial court's
factual detennination that alterative service was justified. She is challenging the trial court's
legal detennination that publication was an appropriate means of altemati ve service in light

of United States Supreme Court precedent (Mu!lant: v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 ( 1950)) and Utah Supreme Court precedent ( Graham v. Smmya, 632 P.2d 851,
853-54 (Utah 1981 )) to the contrary .
.J

In an attempt to side-step this precedent, Plaintiff argues that Mrs. Baker's reliance
on Alullane is misplaced. Plaintiff asserts that Mrs. Baker ""ignores Utah case law directly
on point." Appellee's Brief at 22 ... In Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. 1Harrs, 2004 UT 89, ~J 11,

11

100 P.3d 1211, 12 l 5," it argues, "the Utah Supreme Court made clear that Utah courts satisfy
the due process concerns outlined in Mullane by first requiring a plaintiff to exercise
reasonable due diligence in attempting to locate and serve a defendant before alternative
service by publication may be sought or allowed." Id. This assertion is misleading. Jackson

Construction is actually fatal to Plaintiffs position.
While Jackson Construction held that '"litigants may not resort to service by
publication until they have first undertaken reasonably diligent efforts to locate the party to
be served," Jackson Const. at ~l 11, Mrs. Baker does not argue on appeal that Plaintiff failed
to meet this requirement. After all, there was no need for Plaintiff to locate Mrs. Baker; it
knew where she lived and had already communicated regarding these matters with her
husband, who was acting in her behalf, via email.

Moreover, although the evidence

presented to the trial court strongly refutes any notion that Mrs. Baker was attempting to
evade service of process,5 Mrs. Baker does not contest on appeal that it was reasonable for
the trial court to order alternative service after five failed service attempts. Rather, the issue
is whether service by publication to the exclusion ofall other known means of service readily

5

Among other things, evidence presented to the trial court established that: ( 1) the
front room of Mrs. Baker's residence was converted by her husband as an office; (2) Mr.
Baker had instructed his assistant, who worked at this office, not to answer the front door,
as anyone coming to the front door would be there for personal reasons; (3) Mr. Baker also
maintained a legally confirming apartment in his residence and had tenants living there
during the relevant time; (4) Mrs. Baker, who was five months pregnant with twins during
this time, was not home very often due to complications she was experiencing with her
pregnancy; (5) the Bakers eventually lost the twins, and in aftermath fell behind for a time
in many of life's administrative tasks, such as reviewing mail. R. 285-87.
12
l

available was constitutionally permissible-the actual due process concern addressed by
Mullane.

Moreover, Jackson Construction did not hold that service by publication is
appropriate in all circumstances so long as the litigant satisfies the diligent efforts
requirement. Indeed, the facts of Jackson Construction did not concern Mu/lane's factual
scenario where a defendant was served exclusively by publication even though the defendant
--could [have] easily be[ en] informed by other means at hand."' Alu/lane, 339 U.S. at 318-19.
Rather, Jackson Construction reiterated A,/u/la11e·s .. recognition that publication alone is
generally not a reliable means of informing interested parties that their rights are at issue
before the court.,. Jackson Const. at •j 11 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315) (emphasis
added). Based on this recognition, and still following Mu/lane's precedent, it then reiterated
that even where .. alternative service is authorized, it must be ·reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action to the
extent reasonably possible or practicable."' See Jackson Const. at ~j 22 (quoting 339 U.S. at
31-4 ). Based on this precedent, the Court concluded that service by publication in the Jackson
Construction case \Vas --functionally equivalent to rolling up the summons. shoving it into

a bottle. and throwing it into the ocean." Id. at ~I 22.
Despite the universal recognition that service by publication is not likely to apprise
anyone of anything. Plaintiff argues that Mrs. Baker's ··position that alternative service by
publication was not calculated to provide her notice is disingenuous." Id. at ~I 27. To support
this incredible assertion, Plaintiff cites facts not contained in the record but invented by

13

Plaintiff: for example, that Mrs. Baker learned about the tax sale from reading the newspaper.
Because Mrs. Baker learned about the tax sale in the newspaper, the argument goes, she
would likely have also seen the legal notice regarding the complaint filed against her.
Putting aside the giant leap this argument requires the Court to make (that is; because
l\frs. Baker saw one notice on one occasion she would have seen all other notices on all other
occasions), there is nothing in the record actually establishing that Mrs. Baker learned of the
tax sale in this fashion or that she even reads the newspaper. Nor is there anything in the
record that even hints that publication in the newspaper is the only way the county notices
tax sales.
Not to be hampered by this or the prohibition of citing matters not ofrecord, Shurtleff~
20 I 2 UT 4 7 at ~I 6 n.4, Plaintiff cites to the Utah County website to show that notice of tax
sales are published in The Dai~v Herald. The problem with this, of course, is the reason this
information is not in the record is because it was not raised below. Had it been, Mrs. Baker
\vould have had the opportunity to point to the other methods Utah County uses to publish
notice of tax sales. \vhich Plaintiff omits from its argument. and establish the means she
actually used to discover the sale. Regardless. Plaintiffs conclusory argument should be
given only the weight to \vhich it is entitled-nothing. The fact is, like Jackson and virtually
every other case, serving Mrs. Baker by running a legal notice in the newspaper was akin to
putting a note in a bottle and throwing it out to sea.
In sum, service by publication in this case, where Plaintiff had other means of service
(mail and email) readily available to it, simply does not pass constitutional muster. Because

1-l

(I) ""[a] lack of [personal jurisdiction] is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with
respect to a particular litigant;" (2) ·•[f]or a court to acquire jurisdiction, there must be a
proper issuance and service of summons; and (3) .. An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated. under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections," Jackson

Const. 2004 UT 80 at ~l~i 7 ( citation omitted. second alteration in Jackson Const.), the trial
court in this case never obtained proper jurisdiction over Mrs. Baker and its judgment must
be set aside.
Rule 4 's general allowance to serve by publication under certain circumstances does
not trump this precedent nor the constitutional requirement that publication may not be
invoked except when there is no other possible means of service. As the Utah Supreme
Court ruled 35 years ago: ""Even [ where publication is justified generally]. however,
publication is not a constitutionally acceptable means of notice of the pendency of litigation
where •it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other
means at hand."' Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 85 l, 853-54 (Utah 198 l) (quoting Alu/lane,

339 U.S. at 319).

VII.

THE COURT SHOULD A WARD ATTOR.~EY FEES TO MRS. BAKER.
Plain ti ff should be sanctioned for filing a frivolous brief containing multiple

misstatements of material fact. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures provides
that if either party files a frivolous brief, the Court ··shall award just damages," including
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reasonable attorney fees to the aggrieved party. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). The rule defines a
frivolous brief as ·~one that is not grounded in fact .... '' Id. at 33(b ). The rule states that the
Court ·'may award damages upon request of any party ... as part of a party's response to a
motion or other paper." Id. at 33(c)( l ). A party against whom damages are sought is entitled
to a hearing on the matter: Id. at 33( c)(3 ).
Appellee's brief is not grounded in fact. To the contrary, the briefs principal
arguments are supported by assertions contrary to the facts of this case. For example:
1.

Plain ti ff s assertions that there is no ··constitutional provision which is directly

relevant or material to this appeal, " Appellee 's Brief at l, ignores the fact that one of the
principal arguments advanced by Mrs. Baker, and the only argument squarely addressed by
Plaintiff: is that service in this case was constitutionally deficient under the Due Process
clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions; 0
2.

Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker failed to raise the meritorious defense

and attorney fees issues in her moving memorandum, is false and refuted by the record;
3.

Plaintiff's similar representation that Mrs. Baker's moving memorandum cited

only Rule 60{b )(-+ ), \vhen in fact Mrs. Baker's memorandum did not cit~ any specific
subsection. including 60{b)(4). is false and refuted by the record:
4.

Plaintiff's representation that Mrs. Baker abandoned the meritorious dd'ense

and attorney fees issues at oral argument, is false and refuted by the record;
6

lt is astonishing that Plaintiff could assert that no constitutional provision is relevant
to this appeal when it itself discusses due process at pages 16, 21 (twice), 22 (four times), 23,
and 28 (""In sum, [Mrs. Baker] was properly served in accordance with appropriate due
process considerations .... '").
16

5.

Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker's property value assertion was not

part of the record but raised for the first time in her reply memorandum, is false and refuted
by the record;
6.

Plaintiff asserts that the Utah Supreme Court, in Jackson Construction, '·made

clear that Utah courts satisfy the due process concerns outlined in Mullane by [satisfying the
diligent efforts requirement]," when the due process concerns actually discussed in Mullane
had nothing to do with efforts to find defendants but the prohibition of serving defendants

whose location was already known exclusively by publication.
Had Plaintiff made only one minor misrepresentation, or two, Mrs. Baker would not
think to seek fees under Rule 33. But when Plaintiff makes three, four, five, and even six,
material misrepresentations, it submits that an award of fees under the rule is in order.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in her opening brief, Mrs.
Baker respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision to deny relief to
Mrs. Baker under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and remand this action to
the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this

13:h

day of June. 2016.
HOOLE & KING, LC.
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